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HOW "ECCENTRIC" WAS MR. JUSTICE HARLAN?
EDWARD F. WAITE*
A CONCURRING opinion in Adamson v. California,' contained the
following statement: "Between the incorporation of the Fourteenth
Amendment into the Constitution and the beginning of the present
membership of the Court [1868-1937]-a period of seventy years-
the scope of that Amendment was passed upon by forty-three
judges. Of all these judges only one, who may be respectfully called
an eccentric exception, ever indicated the belief that the Fourteenth
Amendment was a shorthand summary of the first eight Amend-
ments theretofore limiting only the Federal Government, and that
due process incorporated those eight Amendments as restrictions
upon the powers of the States." The allusion was to Justice John
Marshall Harlan, who died in 1911 after thirty-four years of service.
It is at least doubtful whether Justice Harlan would have agreed to
identification by the statement that he viewed the Fourteenth
Amendment as "a shorthand summary of the first eight Amend-
ments," and the views he really held and expressed were not with-
out support among his colleagues.
The writer's memory of Justice Harlan goes back to the early
'Eighties, when the noble face, commanding stature and resounding
voice of "the Kentucky giant" made him, in the impressionable
observation of a young law student, a conspicuous figure in the
group of Supreme Court Justices. Better reasons for admiration de-
veloped later, and the language quoted was extremely distasteful to
at least one reader. It seemed definitely disrespectful in spite of the
casual disclaimer. Neither common usage nor the dictionary sup-
plies a meaning of the word "eccentric" which does not involve dis-
respect when applied to a Justice of the Supreme Court of the
United States. Surely neither emotional nor intellectual oddities
have any proper place in that tribunal. If there could be any doubt
about the personally critical import of the comment, it disappears
when certain jurists selected from the forty-three are mentioned as
"among the greatest in the history of the Court," who were "alert
in safeguarding and promoting the interests of liberty and human
dignity through law," but "also mindful of the relation of our federal
system to a progressively democratic society, and therefore deeply
regardful of the scope of authority that was left to the States even
*Judge of the District Court for the Fourth District, Minnesota, 1911-
1941 (retired).
1. 332 U. S. 46, 62 (1947). •
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after the Civil War. And so they did not find that the Fourteenth
Amendment, concerned as it was with matters fundamental to the
pursuit of justice, fastened upon the States procedural arrange-
ments which in the language of Mr. Justice Cardozo 'only those
who are narrow and provincial' would deem essential to 'a fair
and enlightened system of justice.' 2'' It is of course very common
to buttress a Supreme Court opinion with great names; but not
often is it found necessary to add in effect that "only Justice So-
and-so was on the other side, and he doesn't count." What, in
particular, was the judicial solecism which called for this unusual
type of argument? The Adamson case was an appeal from a judg-
ment of the supreme court of California, affirming a conviction
of murder. The issues and the Court's decision of them, insofar as
they are here relevant, appear by the following quotations from
Justice Reed's opinion: "It is settled law that the clause of the
Fifth Amendment, protecting a person against being compelled to
be a witness against himself, is not made effective by the Fourteenth
Amendment as a protection against state action on the ground that
freedom from testimonial compulsion is a right of national citizen-
ship, or because it is a personal privilege or immunity secured by
the Federal Constitution as one of the rights of man that are listed
in the Bill of Rights.3 ... The due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, however, does not draw all the rights of the federal
Bill of Rights under its protection.4 ... Specifically, the due process
clause does not protect, by virtue of its mere existence, the ac-
cused's freedom from giving testimony by compulsion in state
trials that is secured to him against federal interference by the
Fifth Amendment.5 . . . A right to a fair trial is a right admittedly
protetced by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment ... Palko6 held that such provisions of the Bill of Rights as
were 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty' became secure from
state interference by the clause. But it held nothing more."7 By
these tests it was concluded that the procedure in the California
court must be sustained as amounting to a fair trial.
These propositions were met by an elaborate argument by
Justice Black in a dissenting opinion in which Justice Douglas
2. Id. at 62.
3. Adamson v. California, 332 U. S. 46, 50-51 (1947).
4. Id. at 53.
5. Id. at 54.
6. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U. S. 319 (1937).
7. Adamson v. California, 332 U. S. 46, 53-54 (1947).
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joined, and which Justices Murphy and Rutledge supported in a
separate opinion.
If we are to consider the particular views held by Justice Har-
lan which were deemed to mark him as an "eccentric exception"
among his colleagues, it is fair to look to his own expression of
those views. These are found in his dissenting opinions in four
cases :
Hurtado v. California, 110 U. S. 516 (1884).
O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U. S. 323 (1892).
Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U. S. 581 (1900).
Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U. S. 78 (1908).
Hurtado was a prosecution for murder without indictment but
upon information in compliance with the constitution and statutes of
California. It was attacked under the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Said Justice Matthews for the Court:
"The proposition of law we are asked to affirm is that an indict-
ment or presentment by a grand jury, as known to the common
law of England, is essential to that 'due process of law', when ap-
plied to prosecutions for felonies, which is secured and guaranteed
by this provision of the Constitution of the United States . . .- I
The Court's conclusion was to the contrary. Justice Harlan, the sole
dissenter (Justice Field took no part in the decision), in a careful
argument largely historical, reached an opposite result.
Whether Justice Harlan's position in the case is fairly stated in
the "shorthand" phrase may be judged on the basis of what was
claimed by the appellant and what was said by the Court (Mat-
thews J.) and by Justice Harlan. The Court said: "It is main-
tained on behalf of the plaintiff in error that the phrase 'due process
of law' is equivalent to 'law of the land', as found in the 29th
Chapter of Magna Charta; that, by immemorial usage, it has ac-
quired a fixed, definite and technical meaning; that it refers to and
includes, not only the general principles of public liberty and private
right which lie at the foundation of all free government, but the
very institutions which, venerable by time and custom, have been
tried by experience and found fit and necessary for the preserva-
tion of those principles, and which, having been the birthright and
inheritance of every English subject, crossed the Atlantic with the
colonists, and were transplanted and established in the fundamental
laws of the State; that having been originally introduced into the
Constitution of the United States as a limitation upon the powers
of the government brought into being by that instrument, it has
S. Hurtado v. California, 110 U. S. 516, 520 (1884).
1953]
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now been added as an additional security to the individual against
oppression by the States themselves; that one of these institutions
is that of the grand jury, an indictment or presentment by which
against the accused in cases of alleged felonies is an essential part
of due process of law, in order that he may not be harassed or
destroyed by prosecutions founded only upon private malice or
popular fury." "This view," the Court continued, "is certainly sup-
ported by the authority of the great name of Chief Justice Shaw."'
The Court does not seem to have found in this view any analogy
to a stenographic short-cut. Serious argument was presented on
the basis of the wording of the Amendments.10 The concluding
words of Justice Harlan's dissent were these: "The Court in this
case, while conceding that the requirement of due process of law
protects the fundamental principles of liberty and justice, adjudges
in effect that an immunity or right, recognized at the common law
to be essential to personal security, jealously guarded by our Na-
tional Constitution against violation by any tribunal or body exer-
cising authority under the General Government, and expressly or
impliedly recognized, when the 14th Amendinent was adopted, in
the Bill of Rights or Constitution of every State in the Union, is
yet not a fundamental principle in governments established, as
those of the States of the Union are, to secure to the citizen liberty
and justice, and therefore is not involved in that due process of
law required in proceedings conducted under the sanctions of a
State. My sense of duty constrains me to dissent from this interpre-
tation of the supreme law of the land."'"
The facts in O'Neil were complicated and need not be recited
in detail. The case was dismissed on the ground that no Federal
question was involved. Justice Field dissented, contending that the
Court had jurisdiction under the Commerce Clause and that, the
case being properly before the Court, the penalties imposed on the
defendant ought to be held to be a "cruel and unusual punishment",
forbidden to the state under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments. "While, therefore, the ten amendments [Bill of Rights] as
limitations on power, and, so far as they accomplish their purpose
and find their fruition in such limitations, are applicable only to
the Federal government and not to the states, yet, so far as they
declare or recognize the rights of persons, they are rights belong-
ing to them as citizens of the United States under the Constitution;
9. Id. at 521-522.
10. Justice Matthews, id. at 534-535; Justice Harlan, id. at 547 et. seq.
11. Id. at 557-558.
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and the Fourteenth Amendment, as to all such rights, places a
limit upon state power by ordaining that no State shall make or en-
force any law which shall abridge them."' 2 In a separate dissent,
taking substantially the same ground, Justice Harlan said: "I fully
concur with Mr. Justice Field, that since the adoption of the 14th
Amendment, no one of the fundamental rights of life, liberty or
property, recognized and guaranteed by the Constitution of the
United States, can be denied or abridged by a State in respect to any
person within its jurisdiction. These rights are, principally, enu-
merated in the earlier amendments of the Constitution."' 3 Justice
Brewer concurred "in the main" with this opinion.
In Maxwell the same question as in Hurtado recurred, with an-
other-whether a conviction of robbery in Utah by a jury of eight
was in violation of the Federal Constitution. The Court said-
"That a jury composed, as at common law, of twelve jurors was
intended by the Sixth Amendment . . . there can be no doubt,'
1
but held that the privileges and immunities of a citizen of the
United States do not include the right of trial by jury in a state
court for a state offense. Justice Harlan was again the sole dis-
senter, Justice Field being no longer in the Court. He did not dis-
cuss the first question, but stated that he adhered to his former
view. The second he argued with much earnestness. "If the Court
had not ruled otherwise," he said, "I should have thought it indis-
putable that when by the Fourteenth Amendment it was declared
that no state should make or enforce any law abridging the privi-
leges or immunities of citizens of the United States, nor deprive
any person of life, liberty or property without due process of law,
the People of the United States put upon the states the same re-
strictions that had been imposed upon the national government in
respect as well of the privileges and immunities of citizens of the
United States as of the protection of the fundamental rights of life,
liberty and property."' 5 And he concluded: "If I do not wholly
misapprehend the scope and legal effect of the present decision, the
Constitution of the United States does not stand in the way of any
state striking down guaranties of life and liberty that English-
speaking people have for centuries regarded as vital to personal
security, and which the men of the Revolutionary period universally
claimed as the birthright of men."' 6
12. O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U. S. 323, 363 (1892).
13. Id. at 370.
14. Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U. S. 581, 586 (1900).
15. Id. at 614.
16. Id. at 617.
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The majority had intimated that in the application of due process
in the 14th Amendment to the Bill of Rights there must be a dis-
tinction between matters of traditional procedure and ultimate
rights, foreshadowing the doctrine that presently developed and
still prevails, that the latter are thus protected against the state
and the former not. Justice Harlan expressly repudiated this dis-
tinction1 7 and never afterwards assented to it.
Whether Justice Moody's conclusions in the Twining case",
were right or wrong his opinion shows a truly judicial mind oper-
ating on a high level. His references to Justice Harlan's dissents in
Hurtado and Maxwell make it plain that they do not strike him as
eccentric."9 The questions considered by the Court and the conclu-
sions reached appear in the following quotations from the majority
opinion. In the course of a discussion of the Slaughter Houses
Cases20 it is said: "The exact scope and the momentous conse-
quences of this decision are brought into clear light by the dissenting
opinions. The view of Mr. Justice Field, concurred in by Chief
Justice Chase and Justices Swayne and Bradley, was that the
fundamental rights of citizenship, which by the opinion of the Court
were held to be rights of state citizenship, protected only by the
state government, became, as the result of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, rights of National citizenship protected by the National Con-
stitution." Quoting from Justice Field's dissent: "The Amend-
ment does not attempt to confer any new privileges or immunities
upon citizens, or to enumerate or define those already existing. It
assumes that there are such privileges and immunities which belong
of right to citizens as such, and ordains that they shall not be
abridged by state legislation. If this inhibition has no reference to
privileges and immunities of this character, but only refers, as held
by the majority of the Court in their opinion, to such privileges
and immunities as were before its adoption specially designated in
the Constitution, or necessarily implied as belonging to citizens of
the United States, it was a vain and idle enactment. . . . With
privileges and immunities thus designated or implied no State could
ever have interfered by its laws, and no new Constitutional provi-
sion was required to inhibit such interference." 2' Justice Moody
17. See id. at 616.
18. Twiningv. New Jersey, 211 U. S. 78 (1908).
19. See id. at 98, 99, 112, 113.
20. 16 Wall. 36 (U.S. 1873).
21. Id. at 95. Justice Swayne in his dissent was still more explicit, say-
ing: "In the next category, obviously ex industria, to prevent as far as may
be, the possibility of misinterpretation, either as to persons or things, the
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interpreted this language, in connection with that found in O'Neil,
as expressing the same construction of the Fourteenth Amendment
which was argued in Maxwell by Justice Harlan, but considered it
no longer profitable to examine "the weighty arguments" in its
support :"_ "There can be no doubt, so far as the decision in the
Slaughter House Cases has determined the question, that the civil
rights sometimes described as fundamental and inalienable, which
before the war Amendments were enjoyed by state citizenship and
protected by state government, were left untouched by this clause
[privileges and immunities] of the Fourteenth Amendment.23 In
Maxwell v. Dow, where the plaintiff in error had been convicted in
a state court of a felony upon an information, and by a jury of eight
persons, it was held that the indictment, made indispensable by
the Fifth Amendment, and the trial by jury guaranteed by the
Sixth Amendment, were not privileges and immunities of citizens
of the United States, as those words were used in the Fourteenth
Amendment. The discussion in that case ought not to be repeated. ' ' 24
"The defendants, however, do not stop here. They appeal to another
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and insist that the self-
incrimination... was a denial of due process of law."'25 This claim
the Court discusses at length, with a careful historical review and
citation of many cases, again reaching a negative conclusion.
In disposing of the case the Court assumed without considera-
tion of the facts that these amounted to an infringement of the
privilege against self-incrimination if one existed. 8 Justice Harlan,
once more the sole dissenter, urged that the proper course would
have been to decide whether the facts in the case constituted a vio-
lation of the general privilege against self-incrimination, and thus,
if the conclusion was that they did not, avoid what he regarded as
an "academic" discussion of a very important Constitutional ques-
tion. "But as a different course has been pursued in this case," he
said, "I must of necessity consider the sufficiency of the grounds
phrases 'citizens of the United States' and 'privileges and immunities' are
dropped, and more simple and comprehensive terms are substituted. The sub-
stitutes are 'any person', and 'life', 'liberty', and 'property', and 'the equal
protection of the laws'. Life, liberty, and property are forbidden to be taken
'without due process of law' and 'equal protection of the laws' is guaranteed
to all". Id. at 127. He declared with emphasis that due process had been
violated in the case. That issue was presented and argued by plaintiffs in
error, but was summarily dismissed by the Court.
22. See Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U. S. 78, 98 (1908).
23. Id. at 96.
24. Id. at 99.
25. Ibid.
26. See id. at 114.
19531
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upon which the Court bases its present judgment of affirmance."
Accordingly in an opinion of moderate length and with some elabo-
ration of his previous opinions cited above he argued that im-
munity from elf-incrimination is protected against hostile state
action, not only by the Fifth Amendment but by the privileges and
immunities and the due process clauses of the Fourteenth.
Unless there was eccentricity in persisting in a Constitutional
interpretation thoughtfully formed, carefully expressed, and deemed
to be of extreme importance, even in the face of overwhelming and
repeated rejection by his colleagues, .the views of Justice Harlan on
matters immediately before the Court in the Adamson case afforded
no just ground for characterizing him as "an eccentric exception."
However wrong he may have been he erred within the limits of
sane and careful thinking.2 7
Was he on the questions before the Court in these cases even
an "exception" in any such degree as was implied? Similar views of
the minority of four in the Slaughter House Cases, were recognized
by Justice Moody, and Justice Field reasserted them 19 years later,
Justice Brewer then agreeing "in the main," and it should be ob-
served that the views condemned as eccentric were strongly sup-
ported by Justices Black, Douglas, Murphy and Rutledge in Adam-
son. The extent to which due process has been enlarged in recent
years for the protection of personal rights, apparently to satisfy the
conscience of the Court, and in other fields to serve the Court's
solicitude for the general welfare, seems to make it probable that
there will continue to be eminent lawyers, and even Justices of
the Supreme Court, who will be convinced that justice may be
done more directly than is now recognized by the Court, consti-
tutionally and without questionable and perhaps dangerous exer-
cise of the Court's discretion, by accepting the position advocated
by Justice Harlan and some of his contemporary colleagues, and
srtongly supported after the lapse of half a century by the dissenting
minority in Adamson .
2
Certainly Justice Harlan would not have been termed "an eccen-
tric exception" because he was "the last of the tobacco-spitting
judges," a circumstance which seems to have impressed Justice
Holmes; nor could anyone have taken seriously the quip attributed
to Justice Brewer, that "Justice Harlan retires at eight with one
27. Let any lawyer who doubts this spend a few hours with former
Justice Roberts' little book, The Court and the Constitution (1951).
28. See the brief but highly suggestive opinions of Justices Black and
Douglas in Rochin v. California, 342 U. S. 165 (1952).
[Vol. 37:173
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hand on the Constitution and the other on the Bible, safe and
happy in a perfect faith in justice and righteousness" nor merely
because of strong language used in some of his opinions, for this
has been matched repeatedly by other Justices. When deeply in
earnest Justice Harlan's manner of delivering his opinions was
spirited and sometimes vehement. This was perhaps a tempera-
mental fault; but does it call for a permanent memorial in the
records of the Court?- 9 If the language this writer deems objec-
tionable was justified it must be either because its subject's long
persistence in the particular views again rejected in the Twining
case reached the point of unreasonable pertinacity, or because of the
general character of his judicial service.
Does Justice Harlan's judicial record as a whole show or re-
motely suggest that among his colleagues he was an eccentric ex-
ception? He was a man of marked individuality, with positive
qualities of heart matching those of mind and body. His carefully
formed opinions became convictions which could not be surrendered
because he was outvoted, and no student of his judicial career can
fail to observe that he held himself strictly to two guiding principles
-that the function of the Supreme Court is to do justice within the
full scope of its authority, and that even in the exercise of the broad
latitude which must be permitted in the interpretation of the
Constitution, judicial legislation is a seductive evil which should be
jealously watched and avoided. In his address at the centennial
celebration of the organization of the Court he declared as "vital
principles" of Constitutional law:
"That while the preservation of the States, with authority to deal
with matters not committed to general control, is fundamental in
the American Constitutional system, the Union cannot exist with-
out government for the whole.
That the Constitution of the United States was made for the
whole people of the Union and is equally binding upon all the courts
and all the citizens.
That the general government, though limited in its objects, is
yet supreme as to those objects, is the government of all, its powers
are delegated by all, it represents all and acts for all.
That America has chosen to be, in many respects and to many
29. On two occasions Justice Harlan's manner evoked widespread criti-
cism in the press,--the second Pollock case, 158 U. S. 601 (1895) and
Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U. S. 1, 55 (1911). The former is
discussed with discrimination by David B. Farrelly in the February, 1951
issue of The Southern California Law Review. The Standard Oil outburst
was in May, 1911, five months before Justice Harlan's death in his 79th year.
1953]
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purposes, a nation, and for all these purposes her government is
complete, to all these objects it is competent." 30 Perhaps these
sentiments were platitudes in 1890, when they were uttered, but
surely they were not marks of eccentricity.
Was he eccentric because he was "the Great Dissenter" of his
day? The appropriateness of the title lay in the nature of his diver-
gent views and the tenacity with which he held them rather than
in the number of his dissents, most of which were without written
opinions. They totaled somewhat more than 300, and in the great
majority he was not alone. In 107 he was joined by three or more
of his colleagues. Too unyielding? Perhaps, but hardly eccentric
for this reason in view of the importance of the questions considered
by the Court during the long and critical period of his service. The
vigorous language found in many of his dissents was always aimed
at legal propositions and in no instance personal. That the mere
fact of dissent is in itself no mark of eccentricity need not be
argued to readers of this article: the law's debt to the dissenters is
too well known. Said Chief Justice Hughes, "Unanimity which is
merely formal, which is recorded at the expense of strong, conflict-
ing views, is not desirable in a court of last recort .... A dissent in
a court of last recort is an appeal to the brooding spirit of the law,
to the intelligence of a future day."3 1
After Justice Harlan's death his dissenting opinions were made
the subject of careful study by able lawyers. To one of these
especial attention is invited because of its sympathetic and dis-
criminating tone.3 2 His retired colleague, former Justice Brown,
wrote an elaborate review (1912) in which he said: "While judging
from the past the dissents of Mr. Justice Harlan will probably share
the general fate and will not result in many changes in the law, his
learning and never failing patriotism can hardly fail to impress itself
upon the popular mind, and have a wholesome effect upon the
legislation of the future, as it has already done in what is known as
his 'fellow servant' cases .... His dissents will always be referred
30. Address of Mr. Justice Harlan, 134 U. S. 755 (1890).
31. Hughes, The Supreme Court of the United States, 67-68. The writer
ventures to add to these wise words of "little Hughes", his college classmate
in 1876-1878, the suggestion that if the dissenter is a sound and industrious
lawyer with a strong-even religious-sense of human dignity, to which he
is able to subordinate his Federalist preconceptions, we may have a Harlan
dissent in a Lochner case. If he is a brilliant philosophical jurist we may
have a Holmes dissent in the same case. Both sowed the same seed and
should share in grateful recognition when the harvest comes.
32. See Knight, The Dissenting Opinions of Justice Harlan, 51 Am. L.
Rev. 481 (1917). See the brief discussion of the Knight and Northern
Securities cases at 488-489 and the Civil Rights Cases at 499-500.
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to with a respect due to their learning, their manifest patriotism
and their careful exposition of the law. Some of them will doubtless
become the basis for future legislation, and perhaps for a reversal
by the Court itself. But whatever may be the opinion of posterity
with regard to his work upon the Bench of the Supreme Court, he
will long be borne in affectionate remembrance as a typical Ameri-
can citizen and an ornament to the Federal judicial system." 33
justice Brown's estimate should be considered in the light of the
fact that his opinion when he spoke for the Court in Plessy v.
Fcrguson:14 was the subject of a powerful dissent by Justice Harlan
which has become a classic in the literature of civil rights under
the Constitution.
If the time has come for an adequate appraisal of justice Har-
lan's work in the Supreme Court the present writer is not qualified
to make it." This article discusses it, and that only in very sum-
mary fashion, in but a single-though representative-field, the
interpretation of the war Amendments as applied to Negroes and
other racial minorities. It is appropriate to consider at the outset
some aspects of the national situation when he took office, Dec.
10, 1877. The Federal Government was confronted in all its
branches with important and difficult questions growing out of the
Thirteenth, Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, each the prod-
uct of civil war and fierce political strife, and all adopted within
hardly more than a decade after the Dred Scott decision. Six cases3"
33. See Brown, The Dissenting Opinions of Mr. Justice Harlan, 46 Am.
L. Rev. 321, 352 (1912).
34. 163 U. S. 537 (1896). Although this case has never been express-
ly overruled, it has been whittled down close to the point of insignificance.
Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U. S. 629 (1950) ; McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Board
of Regents, 339 U. S. 637 (1950) ; Henderson v. United States, 339 U. S.
816 (1950). And see Se.gregation and the Equal Protection Clause, 34 Minn.
L. Rev. 289 (1950), a brief in the Sweatt case by the Committee of Law
Teachers. See The Constitutional Doctrines of Justice Harlan, Johns Hopkins
Univ. Studies in Historical and Political Science, Vol. 33. This was pub-
lished in 1915, and since then there has been much judicial activity in the
fields covered by Justice Harlan's opinions.
36. United States v. Avery, 13 Wall. 251 (U.S. 1872); Bleyew v.
United States, 13 Wall. 581 (U.S. 1872) ; The Slaughter House Cases, 16
Wall. 36 (U.S. 1873) ; Alexandria & Washington R. R. v. Brown, 17 Wall.
445 (U.S. 1873) ; United States v. Reese, 92 U. S. 214 (1876) ; United States
v. Cruikshank, 92 U. S. 542 (1876) ; (Hall v. DeCuir, 95 U. S. 485 (1877)
was argued before Justice Harlan came to the Court and decided in January,
1878. Since it is not noted that he did not take part in the decision it is
assumed that he concurred.) A chronological analysis of these cases, and of
all other decisions of the Supreme Court involving constitutional rights of
Negros down to and including 1945 may be found in Waite, The Negro in
the Supreme Court, 30 Minn. L. Rev. 219 (1946). In Waite, The Negro in;
the Supreme Court: Five Years More, 35 Minn. L. Rev. 625 (1951) the
study is carried forward to include Shepherd v. Florida, 342 U. S. 50
1953]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
had come before the Court which involved, or might have been
considered as involving, interpretation of the war Amendments
in their application to the negro race. On the basis of these deci-
sions the interpretation of the Amendments stood as follows: There
had been no important interpretation of the Thirteenth Amend-
ment, but in his dissenting opinion in Bleyewe 7 Justice Bradley
used language as to the protection which that Amendment affords
which was clearly suggestive of Justice Harlan's position in the
Civil Rights Cases3s in 1883. Justice Swayne concurred. The Fif-
teenth Amendment had been limited in Reese"9 to negative signifi-
cance, merely prohibiting State discrimination affecting the right
of franchise on the ground of race, color or previous condition of
servitude. In the Slaughter House Cases the Court had faced a
staggering dilemma: either the Fourteenth Amendment must be so
interpreted as to greatly diminish the effect which was certainly
intended by those who were responsible for its presentation and
adoption, or else, in the view of the majority, the way would be
opened for supervision of the states by Congress and the Supreme
Court to a degree likely to be destructive of the traditional autonomy
of the states. The Court chose the former course, declaring the
doctrine of dual citizenship, citizenship of the United States and
citizenship of the states, and discriminating between the two with
respect to the "privileges and immunities" protected by the Amend-
ment, the former being so protected and the latter not. In Cruik-
shank4" the right of assembly otherwise than for redress of griev-
ances, bearing arms for lawful purposes, being secure from unlawful
violence and voting at state elections were placed in the latter
category.
The new Justice came of a Kentucky family which had held
slaves but voluntarily freed them. He had served in the Union army
and taken an active part in state politics. He was a supporter of
Bell and Everett in 1860 and later a leader in the Republican party,
though not in sympathy with the radical element which was most
active in securing the war Amendments. After the withdrawal of
Federal troops in 1877 the South became more and more deter-
mined and ingenious in its effort to keep the emancipated Negroes
(1951). While Justice Harlan was a member of the Court, there were 38
such cases, of which he took part in all but one, writing the prevailing
opinion in seven, a dissent in eight, and dissenting without opinion in five.
37. 13 Wall. 581 (U.S. 1872).
38. 109 U. S. 3 (1883).
39. 92 U. S. 214 (1876).
40. 92 U. S. 542 (1876).
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as close as possible to their former status, and it was evident that
the field left open by the Supreme Court would be sedulously
worked. Where would the new Justice stand? It was two years
before a test came. In Strauder v. West Virginia41 a Negro had
been convicted of murder by a jury selected under a state statute
which made only white men eligible for jury service. The Court
held that he was thus denied the equal protection of the laws
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. Justice Harlan was
with the majority of seven who concurred in the following language
of the decision (Strong, J.) : "What is this [i.e., the quoted lan-
guage of the 14th Amendment] but declaring that the law in the
states shall be the same for the black as for the white; that all
persons, whether colored or white, stand equal before the laws of
the States, and, in regard to the colored race, for whose protection
the amendment was primarily designed, that no discrimination
shall be made against them by law because of their color? The
words of the amendment, it is true, are prohibitory, but they con-
tain a necessary implication of a positive immunity, or right, most
valuable to the colored race-the right to exemption from un-
friendly legislation against them distinctively as colored,-exemp-
tion from legal discriminations, implying inferiority in civil society,
lessening the security of their enjoyment of the rights which others
enjoy, and discriminations which are steps toward reducing them
to a subject race .... The very fact that colored people are singled
out and expressly denied by a statute all right to participate in the
administration of the law as jurors, because of their color, though
they are citizens and may be in all other respects fully qualified, is
practically a brand upon them, affixed by law, an assertion of their
inferiority and a stimulant to that race prejudice which is an im-
pediment to securing to individuals of the race that equal justice
which the law aims to secure to all others."4 2 It was held that the
broad protection thus granted could be, and had been in the case at
bar, secured by Congress through appropriate legislation. How
different would have been the history of civil rights in the United
States if the Supreme Court had abided by these views! Justice
Harlan did abide by them strictly and courageously. To what extent
there has been a belated recognition of their wisdom and justice
by our people and their Court of last resort, the limits of this article
do not permit inquiry. Lovers of liberty find it an interesting-and,
41. 100 U. S. 303 (1880).
42. Id. at 307-308.
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looking to the future, encouraging-study. 43 If for a Kentucky ex-
slaveholder, an opponent of Lincoln in 1860 and of Reconstruction
radicalism, when laden with the responsibilities of a Supreme
Court Justice, to prove himself throughout a third of a century an
uncompromising champion of human rights and liberties under the
Constitution as he interpreted it, and on such grounds as he ac-
cepted in the Strauder case and himself expressed in the Civil Rights
Cases and Plessy v. Ferguson-if that be eccentricity let the critics
make the most of it.
That John M. Harlan, as man and jurist won and retained the
respect and even affection of the legal profession and of his col-
leagues there can be no doubt. Seldom if ever has Washington seen
so impressive a tribute paid to a public servant as was the dinner
given in his honor on the 25th anniversary of his accession to the
Court.4 1 Making due allowances for the kindly exaggerations of
such occasions, who can read the memorial proceedings of the Bar
of the Supreme Court on October 16, 1911, the address of Attorney
General Wickersham before the Court on January 12, 1912, and
the response of Chief Justice White,4' and believe that these words
were spoken of "an eccentric exception"?
Justice Harlan's judicial career was briefly reviewed by Robert
T. McCracken in 60 Pennsylvania Law Review 297 (1912). As
against the characterization which has evoked the present study the
writer places this summary estimate by a contemporary legal scholar
whose name must command general respect: "His mind was essen-
tially simple in its workings, free from delight in subtle distinctions,
resorting rather to direct and vigorous logic. He was prone to fol-
low authority, and was never so well satisfied as when he could
succeed in bringing a given set of facts under the operation of some
recognized adjudication. ... All through his work runs a current
of reliance upon the established judgments of the court. So, too, he
adhered closely to the precepts of the Constitution, combating at
every turn attempts to strain its interpretation in order to solve
particular exigencies. In the construction of a statute he endeavored
to ascertain the intent of the legislative body which was responsible
for its enactment, and in the absence of any guide to such intent,
it was his custom to accept the words of the act as they are used in
the ordinary affairs of life. A sincere patriot, he was proud and
43. Such a study was recently made. See Watt and Orlikoff, The
Cornng Vindication of Mr. Justice Harlan, 44 Ill. L. Rev. 13 (1949).
44. Washington Post and Star, December 10, 1902.
45. 225 U. S. App. I.
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jealous of the integrity of our time-honored institutions and re-
sented all attempts to alter them by 'judicial legislation.' If there
is criticism of his work it lies in his readiness to carry his convic-
tions to their logical result, regardless of particular hardships, or
even of political and social upheaval. Yet he was a wise and sane
statesman, ever willing and anxious to uphold salutary legislation.
It has been said since his death that he was not among the in-
tellectual giants who have exalted the bench on which he sat. Per-
haps that is true, yet it can safely be asserted that none has filled
the office with greater dignity, integrity or sincerity of purpose, or
with a purer patriotism. His affection for the Constitution and the
institutions existing under it amounted to a religious fervor. His was
a long and honorable term of service, and his death a national loss
-a loss which is tempered only by the splendid monuments he has
left behind, to be handed down for the guidance of posterity."46
46. Id. at 309-310.
